

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

CIVIL INTELLIGENCE SECTION

SPECIAL REPORT

SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

PART XXIV

"KONOYE TRIES AGAIN"

(26 Sep-21 Nov 1940)



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
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Saionji - Harada Memoirs

Chapter 375 (B)

Konoye on Government Policy

Translated by Miss Miwako Yanamoto



"I (KONOYE) encouraged the members of the Committee and also related my sincere determination. This brought back memories of previous Cabinet meetings to MATSUOKA, and he started weeping audibly again. MAEDA, NAKANO Seigo, KANAMITSU, and NAGAI, all members of the old political parties who were present there, were also weeping. Thinking the matter over, the members of political parties are old campaigners and dare-devils, and they do exceedingly evil things. However, on the other hand, they reveal such pure and simple sentiment. They possess the old spirit of tutor and pupil, benevolence and righteousness. In contrast to this, the bureaucrats and ex-government officials - GOTO Fumio is a typical ex-government official - would change to a stern and solemn attitude at such a time. They are very cold, and it's strange."

KONOYE continued: "The Emperor was present at the liaison conference of the Grand Imperial Headquarters on September 9th, and it became a conference in the Imperial presence. At that time, there were sharp inquiries made by Prince FUSHIMI, the Chief of the Naval General Staff, of HOSHINO, the President of the Planning Board, regarding problems concerning oil, iron, and coal. His words were quite severe and pointed. President HOSHINO, who was unused to such places or rather unaccustomed, stuttered and was confused, and he was put in an awkward position. After the conference was over, Prince FUSHIMI, the Chief of the Naval General Staff, immediately summoned President HOSHINO to another room and rather tactfully

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said: 'You may have thought it strange because my words were quite rough when I was questioning you. I had no ill will toward you so do not worry about it.' Thus, he comforted him. In contrast to this, Prince KAN-IN, the Chief of the Army General Staff, merely read off the interpellatory articles as a representative of the Army. He said nothing of his own accord. After the conference was over and we came home, the War Minister said to me: 'I am annoyed with Prince KAN-IN, the Chief of the General Staff,' and he lamented the fact."

KONOYE further stated: "At first, I wondered how Navy Minister OIKATA would make out. Essentially, he is a person who keeps silent. However, he has a very good head and easily grasps the essence of matters. For instance, when MATSUOKA and TOJO argue at a Cabinet meeting, it is difficult to bring matters to a close. At such times, he says: 'Isn't this the main point of what you are arguing about? In that case, shouldn't it be this way?' He smooths the way between them. He has turned out much better than I expected."

I said to Premier KONOYE: "In the first place, as you know, I am absolutely opposed to a Japan-Germany treaty. You say that it is essentially a promise to avoid a war with the United States. However, I think that it might become a matter to invite war with the United States. I saw the letter that came from Financial Commissioner NISHIYAMA to YAMASHITA Kanesaburo. It said: 'United States considers Germany's landing operations (on England) a failure. If the landing operations are a failure, England will become increasingly stronger after October. On one hand, there is the election of the

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President of the United States, and America's entry into the war will probably become increasingly more certain. On the other hand, when I look at the Japanese newspapers that come, they seem like propaganda papers for Germany, and it is a very shameful story.' Judging from these points, if America's entry into the war is evident, then Japan will have to exert herself for Germany. I think that at present, when the people want to end the war as soon as possible and when they want their load lightened, the common sense of the general public will ask why we should exert ourselves willingly in a war with the United States. Speaking from these points, there will probably be a great deal of repercussions when the treaty is made public." Premier KONOYE replied: "Since we are going to conclude a non-aggression treaty with the Soviet, Germany will be the go-between. The Soviet and Japan cannot carry out direct negotiations. It's because Germany enters that we can carry it out. Germany is also making efforts so that the peace plan between Japan and China will proceed smoothly."

I (HARADA) said: "Japan should first ascertain whether she can conclude a non-aggression treaty with the Soviet rather than with Germany. It is all right to conclude a treaty with Germany after there is sufficient conviction of that possibility. We may carry it out with Germany, and the Soviet may not consent. In fact, the United States might pull them in and hinder us. Looking at these various connections, I have a great uneasiness as to whether matters will proceed as smoothly as we think." KONOYE replied: "I am also very speculative about that." KONOYE continued: "After the fall of

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Paris, Germany has assembled large forces in East Prussia and the Near East on the Soviet side. Considering such matters, it is doubtful whether talks between Germany and the Soviet will go smoothly. On one hand, if we consider the bad side, the thing that worries Japan the most is that England might win and come out into the Pacific together with the United States. In case of participation in the European war, the United States felt it would be troublesome to have Japan come out, and fearing Japan, they endeavored to establish the ISHII-LANSING treaty. Therefore, it is a fact that the United States is afraid of Japan. Japan is the one who first started the talks of establishing a treaty between Japan and Germany. The fact that MATSUOKA invited OTT and talked to him was the first opportunity, and it has developed from that to the present stage." I left the Premier's official residence past 6:00 o'clock and returned to Oiso.

I had previously written to SAKATANI, the advisor to the Federated Bank of the Chungking Government at Peking, regarding the present political situation. My viewpoints regarding domestic and foreign affairs were indignant. I had a reply from SAKATANI. When I saw the letter, it made me think that this must be the idea of the militarists. I am writing that letter down for reference.

7 "It is impolite, but there are many superficial observations in your opinion. Then you consider history; or shall I say, the general situation; you must determine the basic cause, or it is no good. The Manchurian Incident was the beginning of the world upheaval. Only,

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as far as Japan is concerned, it is the crossing of the Rubicon. There are many people who complain that the Army is high-handed or that Japan was drawn into the China Incident without a definite scheme. This type of person cannot read the movements of the great forces of the world; that is, world history; from a general standpoint. They are unable to rise above a narrow and shallow viewpoint. I often hear it said: 'Japan has no able leaders. That wasn't so in the past.' What do we seek from a leader? We first seek a clarification of the guiding policy (for national affairs).

"The Manchurian Incident, as previously stated, is the crossing of the Rubicon. The path that Japan should take was settled at that time. Looking at history since then, I can only increasingly feel that way. In a large sense, the guiding policy (of national affairs) is clearly settled. But, the common people pitifully think that there is no guiding policy unless someone like HITLER or MUSSOLINI makes speeches. In a narrow sense, one might possibly say that the guiding policy is not evident.

"The reason I said that your judgment was 'like that of an old man' is because you do not have a clear grasp of the significance of the Manchurian Incident. The significance of the Manchurian Incident is that Japan resolutely put a finger in the Asiatic Continent policy. She demanded that the world recognize her position as the leader of Asia. It means that she will shoulder Asia. That is why it is a steep road; it is not an easy road. It is a road which holds the

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possible danger of war with the Soviet, England, and the United States sometime, somewhere. The significance of the Manchurian Incident is that the situation has entered a state in which the China Incident can't be settled and we might, at any time, get into a war with England and the United States in connection with the problem concerning the South Seas.

"With Japan's economic power as the keynote, there are not a few who say that Japan's destination is aimless. However, there have been no great enterprises established in the past by easy going ways. If there are those who maintain the opinion that the Manchurian Incident is basically an ill-advised plan and that Japan should adhere strictly to SHIDEHARA's foreign policy and should not attempt the Asiatic Continent policy which is full of danger, the Manchurian Incident, to them, is a guiding policy which will lead Japan to destruction. Whether this is right or wrong is another matter, but this is one theory. If there are those who approve of the Manchurian Incident, but think that the present state of affairs is outrageous, they are people who cannot grasp the significance of the crossing of the Rubicon.

"No Fuhrer will rise out of the new political order with that system. Nay, it is a structure which probably will not permit the rise of someone like that. Putting aside scrutiny of such a matter, my viewpoint is that Japan's guiding policy is already set. It's just that there is no fuhrer to make speeches. Since we have put a finger in the Asiatic Continent policy and have crossed the Rubicon, the destination is Rome.

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Otherwise, it is death. CAESAR was intelligent so he understood that very well. The Manchurian Incident is the Rubicon. There is only two destinations, life or death, for Japan who crosses it. (Original parenthesis: If we do not cross, we will take down our sign as a big power and lead a quiet and easy life for a short time).

"How to dispose of the China Incident? What to do about the South Seas problem if the United States should openly interfere? In addition to this, what to do when Russia starts making threats? After the Rubicon is crossed, the path is steep. There is no other way but to seek the very small percentage of safety among the overwhelming dangers. It is just like the time that ODA Nobunaga was attacked by HIRAGAWA Yoshimoto. Do MATSUOKA and OHASHI truly understand the import? Does the Army itself grasp that significance?

"I have many other things to tell you besides what I have written. I shall lay down my pen with the expectation of seeing you in person."

(The above was the letter)

I (HARADA) thought the matter over. SAKATANI and I have an entirely different viewpoint on the basic problems concerning the Asiatic Continent policy. Even if the Rubicon River is to be crossed, there are many things which require a little more consideration if the preparations for the crossing are to be adequate. I thought I would study this matter quietly once more and think it over. I decided to take my time about writing my answer to this

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letter. Looking at this letter, I thought very regretfully that SAKATANI must be overestimating the Army and was dreaming rashly of CAESAR. I would like to have a good talk with him when I see him this time.

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Chapter 376
(4 October 1940)

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Translator: Miss Fumiko Ogawa

Since the 22nd, I (HARADA) had a cold for about 2 or 3 days and due to it, my visit to Prince SAIONJI was delayed. On the morning of the 26th, I went to Okitsu and reported various matters to Prince SAIONJI. At the same time, I also showed him the contents of the treaty. Naturally, Prince SAIONJI has not been in favor of this treaty from the beginning. Premier KONOYE spoke to me about the particulars at the end of the liaison conference, but KIDO did not mention anything to me. Prince SAIONJI listened quietly. He seemed much worried about the international situation and the present internal condition of Japan.

On the morning of the 28th, I (HARADA) went to Shinagawa. I attended the memorial service held for Mrs. HOSOKAWA (daughter-in-law of Marquis HOSOKAWA) on the 50th day since her death. I met KIDO there at the HOSOKAWA's. I said to KIDO: "If you don't mind, I would like to know the particulars regarding the problem-- what took place between the Premier and the Emperor. I think it is something that should be reported to Prince SAIONJI....." KIDO said: "I feel sorry for Prince SAIONJI. I thought of visiting him and explaining the whole story, but it is hard for me to do so." Therefore, I told him: "That may be your personal feelings, but after all, whether you like it or not, you should mention the facts to Prince SAIONJI, due to your position."

On the 29th and 30th, I rested at Oiso; returning to Tokyo on the evening of the 30th. On the morning of the 1st, I went to see Prince SAIONJI at Okitsu and reported. Among the things I heard from KONOYE, there was: "I (KONOYE) went to see Gen. ARAKI the other day with the intention of having him as a State Councillor. ARAKI spoke to me for approximately 3 hours on various subjects."

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matters and with tears in his eyes, he showed great concern about the present critical situation. He stated: 'I have been appointed a minister and state councillor often. Within my circle, I am one that has been treated well, for the others were not that fortunate. TATEKAWA, KOISO and others of other circles, have also been appointed ambassadors and ministers too. Therefore, I would like to have Gen MAZAKI appointed state councillor instead of myself. Maybe you are not aware of the conditions in the Army circles, but on the whole, the officials are being engulfed in the Communist movement. It seems that the young officers and officials have Communistic ideals too. In order to effectuate the unification of the Army, it is necessary to have someone that is from our circle.' He related many instances regarding Communistic movements and showed a worried countenance. I had to listen to ARAKI's 3 hour conversation. I returned stumped.

"OTANI Kozui, Gen. HAYASHI, and ADACHI Kenzo shall also be appointed State Councillors. Previously, OTANI Sonyu had asked me: 'Could you have OTANI Kozui appointed to some position?' That is not the only reason for my appointing OTANI Kozui. However, I am appointing him (OTANI) and HAYASHI Senjuro, the former Premier.

"Sometime ago, KUHARA came to me and said: 'Please appoint OGUCHI Kiroku and OKADA Tadahiko to some position.' Therefore, I thought that if I negotiate with KUHARA, he might withdraw and instead, I could have either OGUCHI or OKADA as State Councillor and the other as the Director of the New Order. However, KUHARA, instead of withdrawing, personally came out and finally accepted the position of State Councillor."

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KONOYE also said: "I encouraged ADACHI to accept the position of Privy Councillor, but he refused saying that he did not want to accept such a position at present. Therefore, he was appointed State Councillor. Regarding the relations with Soviet Russia, MIYAKAWA will leave for Moscow, and STAMPA will leave Japan. Just about this time, or right after it, MATSUOKA himself might fly to Moscow to conclude the Non-aggression Pact. It takes approximately 4 days by plane from Tokyo to Moscow and I presume he would be back within a month. Things are very complicated and troublesome."

I (HARADA) then told KONOYE: "The New Order is fine; however the prefectural governors and administrative officials are very much concerned about their standpoint when the New Order becomes effective. They are not concerned about their positions but it would be very disadvantageous if they are unable to retain their prestige. HASHIMOTO Kogoro's henchmen, the Young Men's Party of Great Japan (Dai Nippon Seinen-to) in question, have been quite vexatious even normally, but with this New Order, they are ridiculing the governors and police, saying this and that. Their adverse comments towards the government, whenever they hold lecture-meetings, are exceedingly troublesome. The import of the New Order is still not clear and we are worried; especially in the event when the governor is not appointed as the local branch chief of the New Order. The government officials in Kanagawa Prefecture and Shizuoka Prefecture have also voiced the same opinion. I myself thought the same. The bureaucrats should be admonished on their faults and due respect must be given by the Cabinet; for if not their work will make no headway." KONOYE nodded his head and agreed with my opinion.

On the afternoon of the 1st, I (HARADA) went to the Imperial

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Household Ministry. I met the Minister of the Imperial Household. He seemed much concerned about diplomacy and stated: "The Emperor speaks on this matter to me often. Since I am the Imperial Household Minister, I think it is wrong for me to meddle in politics. Therefore, I just listen quietly to the Emperor. I feel very sorry for His Majesty, and don't know how to console him."

Towards evening, I met KIDO. KIDO sighed and said: "There are doubtful points about KONOYE who is committing rash acts. It happened the other day at the HOSOKAWA's when the memorial services were held. KONOYE talked about the State Councillors. He was mentioning those who were good, that there were not many persons, etc. Just then, Prince ICHIJO stood in the hallway. KONOYE, pointing at Prince ICHIJO, stated: 'Well, shall I appoint him (ICHIJO) a State Councillor since he is affiliated with the rightists?' Therefore, I (KIDO) said: 'Prince ICHIJO's appointment as State Councillor is out of the question,' and did not approve. KONOYE'S rash actions are very embarrassing."

"KONOYE further stated: 'Gen. MAZAKI shall be appointed State Councillor.' Therefore, I expressed my disapproval and told him: 'The appointment of Gen. MAZAKI cannot be helped if this is a very important matter and if his appointment is necessary for the nation's sake. The Emperor could also be persuaded in approving his appointment although His Majesty does not like him personally. However, the appointment of State Councillors are not that important. It is unnecessary to have persons like MAZAKI who had been connected with the February 26 Incident, and who has an unpleasant record, appointed to such a position.' Later, (KIDO) inquired into the matter and it became evident that ARAO of the Shimpei-tai, desiring to have MAZAKI appointed as State Councillor, had been persuading KONOYE to appoint him."

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"The Emperor ordered me: 'Report the particulars of the treaty to the former Lord Privy Seals, MAKINO and YUASA.'

Therefore, I called on both MAKINO and YUASA. MAKINO had a better understanding of the situation and stated that it could not be helped. However, YUASA made some unfavorable remarks."

I (HARADA) had heard from KONOYE, that on September 19th, the Emperor had asked KIDO: "Does it seem that KONOYE is disgusted with his Premiership and that he'll abandon his Cabinet?" Therefore, I (HARADA) asked KIDO whether it was true. KIDO answered: "No, it is not so. The other day, the Emperor asked me: 'I wonder if KONOYE will soon make his retreat after stirring things up.' I replied: 'I don't think KONOYE will take such irresponsible actions.' His Majesty stated: 'Well then, in case of an emergency, I wonder if KONOYE will still remain as Premier and see the crisis through together with me.' To that, I (KIDO) replied: 'Certainly, I believe KONOYE is determined to do so. The next time Your Majesty received KONOYE in audience, you should ask him personally.' The Emperor further stated: 'I wonder if it would be right for me to ask him directly?' I replied: 'Certainly, it is permissible. As a matter of fact, KONOYE would be honored to be granted an audience with you.' His Majesty answered: 'Well, I shall do that.' Therefore, when KONOYE proceeded to the Imperial Palace on the 20th, the Emperor spoke to KONOYE." I (HARADA) am sure KIDO refrained from mentioning to KONOYE that His Majesty stated that KONOYE was stirring up... KIDO merely said: "The Emperor stated that he wondered whether KONOYE would be disgusted with his Premiership and retreat."

By looking at this, the matter is causing His Majesty a great deal of solicitude. It is doubtful whether or not the Emperor approved KONOYE's actions whole-heartedly. There are many doubtful points. Taking various things into consideration, I feel very sorry for His Majesty. I can readily see why the Imperial Household

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Minister is worried about diplomacy, and at the same time, sympathizes with the Emperor's feelings.

On the morning of the 2nd, Gen. TERAUCHI came to see me. Gen. TERAUCHI said: "Prince KANIN will resign as the Chief of the General Staff Headquarters and his successor will be Gen. SUGIYAMA. It seems that ISHIIA Kanji will become Deputy Chief of the General Staff Headquarters. He was secretly worried about the matter. However, I (HARADA) heard from Capt. TAKAI that TSUKADA, the Commander of the Military Staff College, had been designated as the Deputy Chief of the General Staff Headquarters. It is also said that the Chief of the Naval General Staff will remain in office.

The same day, ARITA came to Oiso. He talked on various matters. IKEDA Seihin also came over and stated that ARITA said: "It is best to remain silent, for it is futile to do anything at present."

Early on the morning of the 3rd, I (HARADA) went to Okitsu and reported various matters to Prince SAIONJI. Prince SAIONJI seemed much concerned about diplomacy. I told Prince SAIONJI: "There are some who say that MATSUOKA must be insane. I am worried about MATSUOKA." When I said that, Prince SAIONJI laughingly said: "It will do him good if he becomes insane. On the contrary, unfortunately, he might regain his sanity."

Prince SAIONJI feared: "It is all right for MATSUOKA to go to Moscow to negotiate with the Russian Government. However, we cannot depend on MATSUOKA if he merely goes to Moscow, following Germany's footsteps. It would be fine if MATSUOKA could display a threatening attitude, but very likely he can't. It seems that MATSUOKA's trip to Moscow will turn out to be a failure."

He (Prince SAIONJI) also stated: "KONOYE is devoting himself in making preliminaries, but it is doubtful whether he is

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actually assuming the helm of state affairs." Therefore, I (HARADA) told Prince SAIONJI: "I believe KONOYE is now ready to do so." Since it was during an air-raid drill, Prince SAIONJI worriedly said: "I do not go out during any air-raid drills, so would not know the actual conditions, but I heard that the things going on are too ridiculous to be taken seriously. Will this do?" I (HARADA) again returned to Oiso on the 11:50 p.m. train.

On the morning of the 4th, I telephoned the Chief Cabinet Secretary: "The prefectural governors, the chiefs of police and the section chiefs under them, are greatly concerned about the application of the New Order. If Premier KONOYE detests the bureaucrats himself, then wouldn't it interfere with the work of the entire organization? I would like you to bear these things in mind." I telephoned the Premier's official residence and also mentioned the same matter. KONOYE seemed delighted when I told him that Prince SAIONJI inquired about his health.

KONOYE was to leave for Momoyama, to visit the Imperial Mausoleum on the morning of the 4th, at 9:00 a.m.

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Chapter 377
(15 October 1940)

Takagi Writes Again

Translated by S/Sgt. Clyde Takechi

I came to Tokyo on the 5th and had dinner with YUKI, the Governor of the Bank of Japan. Yesterday, KIDO called on me to thank me for having his son employed at the Bank of Japan, and later Admiral NOMURA also called on me for the same purpose. At this meeting, KIDO, like myself, persuaded Admiral NOMURA to go to the United States. In regard to this matter, YUKI said: "It is very important that a person like NOMURA should go to the United States. Therefore, I would like to have you persuade Admiral NOMURA too."

On the way home to Oiso that evening, I met Capt. TAKAGI (Navy). Captain TAKAGI said: "This is indeed perplexing. At Hongkong, the military officials at outposts abroad have transported guns, landed a force of approximately 1,000 men and they are planning to attack Hongkong from the rear. It seems that their plan is to create a disturbance in Hongkong and then send troops over. But, the Grand Imperial Headquarters have absolutely no connection with this matter. It is nothing more than an arbitrary action of the military officials at outposts abroad. Therefore, the Grand Imperial Headquarters have issued strict orders to posts abroad and are preventing them from action. The Supreme Headquarters is supposed to summon the staff immediately and demand an explanation. The Army began to carry on such activities as the proposed landing of troops in French Indo-China but the Navy cannot take part in such actions unless

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it was ordered by the Grand Imperial Headquarters. Such actions are indeed annoying!"

In conclusion, TAKAGI said: "The fact is, that for some time, the Navy has been desiring to have an influential person sent to the United States and have him observe the domestic situation there and acquaint himself with the situation of the American Navy. In order to realize that plan, I think Admiral NOMURA is most suited. Therefore, it seems that the Navy Vice-Minister has gone to see Admiral NOMURA and requested him to do so. Moreover, the Foreign Minister also requested the Navy Minister to persuade Admiral NOMURA into compliance. Will you also persuade Admiral NOMURA to forget his personal ambition and go to the United States?"

On the 6th, I phoned Admiral NOMURA and inquired whether it was possible for him to come to Oiso in the afternoon. NOMURA replied: "I shall try to be there. If it is about three o'clock, I think I can be there." Around 3:00 p.m., Sunday, he called on me and after talking about various matters I (HARADA) said: "The other day, when I heard from Foreign Minister MATSUOKA that you turned down his request to go to the United States, I thought it was quite natural and did not say anything to you before. However, after thinking it over, the American Government's attitude towards Japan is icy cold and I realize that this is not very good for Japan. However, the general atmosphere of America matters to us more than the concern of the affairs of the government. Therefore, for the accomplishment of this matter, Japan must send an influential person to the United States who could be of considerable service

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in various ways. Won't you please go to the United States at this time and sacrifice your personal ambitions? Since I have heard that the Army and Navy, and particularly the Foreign Office, are looking forward towards it, I have reconsidered this matter and since I thought that you should make an effort to go, I felt you should be persuaded." Admiral NOMURA replied: "I cannot refuse the Navy who are concerned over me and is persuading me in various ways. However, when Foreign Minister MATSUOKA, who only observes the external appearance of matters, says such things, I cannot comply with him." Therefore, I said: "However, the Premier also desires your going, so in the near future, I think the Premier will speak to you on that matter." After finishing supper, Admiral NOMURA leisurely chatted and left around 9:30 p.m.

On the evening of the 7th, upon hearing that Premier KONOYE had returned to Tokyo, I immediately phoned KONOYE that night and relayed Admiral NOMURA's story. I said: "In all probability, you may have to call Admiral NOMURA and request him." KONOYE replied: "Of course, I intend to do so." Later, according to what I heard, the Navy Minister requested: "By all means, please request the Premier to call Admiral NOMURA and persuade him."

I came to Tokyo on the 9th and the financial situation was very serious. Upon meeting KASHIWAGI of the Yokohama Specie Bank and also the officials of Mitsui, they appeared to be considerably concerned over the matter.

Furthermore, on the morning of the 10th, I met my former instructor at middle school, Professor YAMAGUCHI, a great botanist who had been in the United States for

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many years and had returned to Japan. When I inquired into the American situation, he said: "There is no doubt that the United States is considerably afraid of Japan. However, America's participation in the war cannot be considered." However, since this is the opinion of a scholar, I naturally believe that it may differ from the general opinion.

On the 11th, when I met some members of the House of Peers, they said that they are starting a movement to take a careful attitude in regard to the constitution and the new national order issue. It appears as though Premier KONOYE is cleverly handling the House of Peers with an air of respect in regard to that matter. I heard from IZAWA Takio that Premier KONOYE's explanation at the gathering of influential members of the House of Peers at Hoshigaoka, was very proficient. However, it seems that public sentiment against KONOYE is mounting considerably.

On the 13th, Captain TAKAGI of the Navy sent me a memorandum which is attached at the end of this chapter in regard to the urgent problems as of this date.

On the afternoon of the 12th, when I called on former Premier YOMAI, he said: "This is very annoying, but I am living practically isolated from society." However, he was deeply concerned about diplomacy and domestic administration.

That evening, I had supper with Gen. ARAKI at ASANO Ryozo's home and inquired into the various current situations. He has observed the general situation and had the impression that KONOYE is being influenced by the Communists. Thus, he was considerably worried about it. Particularly, in regard to the diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia, he said that the concluding of a non-

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aggression pact with Russia will not only affect the nation internally and ideologically, but it is also a wrong course of action. He was very indignant on this matter. Thus, I said: "We must restrain ourselves from mere criticism of others and from causing estrangement between others. However, this is the time for you to exert your utmost efforts in fully supporting the ideals of the Constitution." For the present, the general expressed his agreement on this matter.

I went to Okitsu on the 14th, and when I reported the subsequent situation to the Prince (SAIONJI), he said: "After all, it seems as if the rebel has won again."

That night, when I had supper with the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet, Admiral YAMAMOTO, and inquired on various matters, he said: "It is indeed outrageous. However, with the understanding of the Chief of the Naval General Staff and the Navy Minister, it is absolutely necessary to make preparations for whatever the Navy is to undertake in the future. Therefore, as I shall unreservedly demand preparations for the future, I would like to have the matter considered accordingly. Then, in my opinion, in order to fight the United States, we must fight with the intention of challenging practically the entire world. In short, even if a non-aggression pact is concluded with Soviet Russia, Russia cannot be relied upon entirely. While we are fighting with the United States, who can guarantee that they will observe the pact and not attack us from the rear? At any rate, as long as matters have come to this point, I shall exert my utmost efforts and will probably die fighting on the battleship Nagato. During that time, Tokyo will

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probably be burnt to the ground about three times and tough times will ensue. Moreover, in the end, although it is pitiful for KONOYE and others, they may be torn from limb to limb by the public. It is indeed a perplexing matter, but as long as it has come to this point, it is inevitable."

Early on the morning of the 15th, I met Gen. SUGIYAMA for the first time in a long while, and when I congratulated him for his promotion to Chief of the General Staff Headquarters, he seemed to be very satisfied about it. SUGIYAMA said: "As for the supreme command, I believe that we must make it an absolute command. Therefore, as soon as I assumed my post, I greeted my subordinates and cautioned them: 'In regard to matters closely related to supreme command, intervention is necessary, but in regard to matters other than these, whether they be directly related but of little concern or indirectly related, it is unfavorable for the Supreme Command to interfere with them. Not only is intervention unfavorable, but it must be avoided.' At any rate, I shall call on KIDO and KONOYE and have a long talk with them." We parted after I said: "Since there are many existing circumstances from before, won't it be better if you find some means to call on the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal whenever you appear at the Imperial Palace?"

MEMORANDUM (as mentioned on page 11)

I shall inform you later of the complications connected with the Dutch East Indies. The Chief (of Naval General Staff) should know the particulars.

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September 22 and 26, and October 6th.

I. NO-JAPANESE TREATY

A. Ambassador ABE concluded treaty negotiations with the WANG Government on October 1st. Only internal procedure (of the government) remains. The first settlement is anticipated by the latter part of October. Proceed according to the policy of recognizing the WANG Government.

B. The Army will abandon the 'Chungking operations' around the middle of August. Then, Foreign Minister MATSUOKA will take over the matter. If the anticipated success cannot be obtained in three weeks, German mediation will be reverted to. At that time, MATSUOKA is scheduled to fly to Berlin and Moscow.

C. MATSUOKA intends to utilize a certain individual of the CHIEH Yung-ming faction whom MATSUOKA had connections with while MATSUOKA was the Vice-President of the Manchurian Railways. It is planned to show the basic peace conditions to this war and conclude a truce (by November or December). The WANG Government and the CHANG Government will be combined and a peace policy with the combined government is planned.

II. HONGKONG STRATEGY

This is the so-called strategy of the Army troops in China. Organize the Honan Autonomous Patriots' Army (12,000) and plan to despatch the troops from the Canton delta area to Humen. This despatched unit will be called the Chungshan-hsien guerilla unit (approx. 3,000). This unit will cross to Paoan-hsien (the first part of October) and by cooperating with the tsing-pang group (forces on small boats) of Hongkong, create a disturbance. Thus,

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in the middle part of October, order the crossing of the border (into Hongkong). This Chinese unit will utilize the Kuo-pang. The understanding and support of the Navy was requested but this was rejected. SAWADA, the Chief of the General Staff Headquarters explained to the Deputy Chief of the Naval General Staff that he was not aware of this situation.

(add.) According to the information of the Cabinet, it appears as though a strategy against Thailand, Burma and Singapore is in progress. On October 6th, I heard that IMAI, a staff officer of the Army Headquarters in China, was ordered to make an explanation of the foregoing.

III. OCTOBER 7th

A. The opposition of the TADA, ITAGAKI and ISHIHARA factions against TOJO is very strong. The reason DOIHARA remained as Director of the Military Academy is to keep the balance of power. ANDO was placed in the Reserves immediately after his return to Japan. OKAMURA may be forced to retire.

B. MATSUOKA promised to have his picture taken by WALLACE, but when they met, MATSUOKA let himself go and hurled his defiance at WALLACE. This story was circulated in the United States by an I.N.S. correspondent. Consequently, public opinion has become worse.

(add.) TRI-PARTITE TREATY PARTICULARS:

1. August 17 - Three Ministry agreement.

July 8 - SATO, KURUSU, and RIBBENTROP conference.

July 15 - SATO and STAHLER conference.

August 1 - MATSUOKA and OTT conference.

2. August 23 - STAHLER arrives in Japan

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3. September 4 - MATSUOKA submits revision plans.

Revision points:

(a) Resolution of war against the United States.

(b) Conclude a military alliance.

(c) Publish a joint statement immediately.

4. September 7 - STAHLER arrives in Tokyo.

Conference with MATSUOKA on the 9th, 10th and the 11th.

5. September 14 - Unofficial Conference between

Grand Imperial Headquarters and Government.

(a) Agree to the fundamental principles.

(b) D-day to be decided (by Japan and Germany).

(c) Mediation for the adjustment of the Russo-Japanese diplomatic relations.

Above conditions desired.

6. September 19 -

(a) Four Ministers' Conference, Cabinet Meeting, Council in the Imperial presence.

(b) Estimate for the attack. Means of affixing time of declaration of war. Mediation between Japan and U.S.S.R.

(c) Obtain letter of support from the German Ambassador in regard to the technical and economic support to Japan.

7. September 19 - RIBBENTROP proceeded to Rome and communicated with MUSSOLINI and CIANO.

8. September 26 - Privy Council Inquiry.

September 27 - Signing of the pact at 7:00 p.m. in Berlin.

P.S.

A. The Tri-Partite Treaty was explained in detail

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to the Chief (of Naval General Staff) and
Commander-in-Chief (of Combined Fleet).

- B. Please do not reveal to others, even to Commander-
in-Chief YAMAMOTO, that I have sent you this
memorandum.

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Chapter 378
(23 October 1940)

Safeguarding of Saionji-Harada Memoirs

Translated by Mr. Mikio Asano

On the 18th, I telephoned (Premier) KONOYE and asked him about the current situation. He said: "Everything has come to an impasse and I am rather troubled over the situation."

I also telephoned KIDO (the Lord Privy Seal) in the morning (of the same day), and sought information on the current situation. He said: "The rightists (ultra-nationalists) seem to be making much adverse criticisms on the (recent shift of) administrative personnel. However, every administration comes up against this sort of thing; so there is nothing to worry about."

ARITA (Hachiro) came to my home and said: "Sometime ago, I met HATOYAMA Ichiro at a wedding celebration. He said: 'Until recently, various kinds of letters, complaining about the current situation, came to me from many persons. However, since two or three days ago, suddenly (instead of letters), many people have come to see me, asking whether anything could be done to better the present situation. They said that the prevailing situation was unbearable, and that the attitude of the financial circles towards the situation seems to have become very critical. I told them: 'Be prudent. If you act too thoughtlessly, the outcome will be unfavorable for you.'"

On that same day, I went to Okitsu (to make the customary report to Prince SAIONJI). I reported to Prince SAIONJI on the latest happenings since I last saw him. I consulted the Prince about requesting

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Prince TAKAMATSU to keep the transcriptions (manuscript of the SAIONJI-HARADA Memoirs) in the care of His Highness until they were delivered into the hands of the Emperor. Prince SAIONJI agreed to this and said: "If His Highness (Prince TAKAMATSU) doesn't mind, I believe that would be a very splendid arrangement."

On the 19th, I returned to my home in Oiso. On the morning of the 20th, because (I learned that) His Highness (Prince TAKAMATSU, a Navy officer) had returned to his palace from his ship, I called him on the telephone and talked with His Highness personally over the phone. His Highness said: "Come at 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon." I went to the Takanawa Palace (of Prince TAKAMATSU at the appointed time). I told His Highness: "This record (manuscript of the SAIONJI-HARADA Memoirs) was started in 1929. The following is the reason why this was undertaken: At the time of the London Treaty (when it was a major political issue), only false rumors about the issue prevailed; and the truth about the matter was never known (to the public). Especially, the attitude taken by the Emperor has been, for the most part, falsely rumored. Moreover, the counsel given to the Throne and actions taken by the Genro (Prince SAIONJI), court officials close to the Emperor, and the Cabinet Ministers on the whole, have been falsely rumored. As a direct result, this created serious perturbations in the political circles; and this was the direct cause of subsequent disturbances in the Army and Navy. The virtues and intelligent perspicacity of the Emperor were perverted almost beyond imagination by propaganda. I felt that this was an exceedingly regrettable fact. Since I (HARADA) knew,

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in my capacity (as Prince SAIONJI's secretary), the (behind-the-scenes) truth of the matter, I felt that there was a necessity for recording this in written form for posterity. Therefore, I consulted KONOYE; we decided to seek the assistance of (Viscountess KONOYE Yasuko) the wife of (Viscount KONOYE) Hidemaro, the younger brother of Prince KONOYE, and have her take it down (as I dictate it) and thus preserve the record (manuscript) for posterity. This (manuscript) has now grown to 10,000 odd pages.

"This is the way in which this memoirs is being made. Every week, I go to see Prince SAIONJI and make a report to him (on the current political situation); my memorandum for this report (to Prince SAIONJI) is used as the basic material (of the SAIONJI-HARADA Memoirs) which I dictate to Viscountess KONOYE Yasuko who takes it down. I then take the transcribed manuscript of the notes to SAIONJI; he reads the material personally, corrects mistakes, and adds whatever additional notes he deems necessary to the manuscript. He returns it to me the next time I go to see him. A clean copy of this is made; this is then edited and filed away.

"Nowadays, this (the fact that the SAIONJI-HARADA Memoirs is being compiled) has occasionally appeared in the newspapers; moreover, even the fact that this (manuscript of the SAIONJI-HARADA Memoirs) is deposited for protective custody in the Sumitomo Trust Co. has become known to the public. I have heard there is danger that a faction of the rightists (ultra-nationalists) might, under certain circumstances, destroy it (manuscript of the SAIONJI-HARADA Memoirs). Therefore, I have consulted

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Prince SAIONJI about this matter and have decided to request Your Highness to keep it in Your Highness' personal custody until it is completed. When it is completed, the original manuscript which has Prince SAIONJI's corrections and revisions on it will be presented to the Emperor in its original form. The edited copy will be printed and published at a suitable occasion. I think it won't be possible, in all probability, to publish the document until after 10 or 15 years have elapsed from the death of Prince SAIONJI. At any rate, the future custody of it (manuscript) is entrusted to (Marquis) MATSUDAIRA, the Chief Secretary to the Lord Privy Seal. I would like to have Your Highness consult MATSUDAIRA and make thorough arrangements so that he will be able to keep in close touch with Your Highness' steward (for preserving the manuscript in Your Highness' custody)."

His Highness (Prince LIKIATSU) said: "I gladly give consent (to your request). I shall give thorough instructions about the matter to YAMANOUCHI, the steward; make suitable arrangements (in regards to the manuscript) with him." I thanked His Highness for this and changed the topic of our discussion.

Next, I explained to His Highness the circumstances under which the recent Tri-Partite Pact was formed; I said: "I still am suspicious of just how the Premier (KONOYE) and the Lord Privy Seal (KIDO) explained the matter (the Tri-Partite Pact) to the Emperor (and secured His Majesty's consent thereto). The Emperor had explicitly been stressing: 'I absolutely shall not permit it (the Tri-Partite Pact).' In view of this,

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Prince SAIONJI is also in great doubt of just how they (the Premier KONOYE and the Lord Privy Seal KIDO) had explained and obtained the Emperor's consent (to the Pact)

"According to KIDO and KONOYE, (the Tri-Partite Pact was formed because) the Navy (which had obstinately opposed the idea up to this time) had (yielded and) given its consent to the pact. At any rate, the fact that the Foreign Minister (MATSUOKA) and the Premier (KONOYE) had explained to the Emperor that there were no means other than the formation of the Tri-Partite Pact for preventing United States from entering into the war (World War II) is evident.

"Prince SAIONJI is filled with feelings of perturbation and regret when he considers the fact that in spite of the Emperor's opposition to the formation of the Tri-Partite Pact, the situation had developed into the formation of the Pact; moreover, for SAIONJI, it is unbearable to think what the inner-most feelings of the Emperor are in regard to this matter. MATSUDAIRA, the Imperial Household Minister, has also harbored deep sympathies for the Emperor. He said: 'Although I have no direct say on politics, whenever I appeared in His Majesty's presence, the Emperor invariably intimated his feelings of regret on this matter (Tri-Partite Pact).'

"On the fact that the Tri-Partite Pact was at last going to be formed, Prince SAIONJI was kept in complete ignorance (by the Government) and it was a complete surprise to him. For instance, in my case, on the day in September on which the Liaison Conference of the Grand Imperial Headquarters was convened, I heard from

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Navy sources that a (Liaison) Conference was being held that very day. From Osaka (where I was on that day) I called KONOYE (in Tokyo) on the telephone around 8:00 o'clock in the evening. KONOYE said: 'I have just returned home now after concluding the Liaison Conference (of the Grand Imperial Headquarters); the Navy has at long last given its consent (to the formation of the Tri-Partite Pact). It will now be formed.'

"The next day (after returning to Tokyo from Osaka), I met KONOYE and asked him about the general details of the matter; however, he didn't say a thing on the most important point of just how he went about obtaining the consent of the Emperor to the matter. I asked the Lord Privy Seal (KIDO): 'Why didn't you tell us (Prince SAIONJI and HARADA) about it beforehand? I would not be saying this to you, if the Prince (SAIONJI) were afflicted with defects such as muddleheadedness, illness, or want of perspicacity. Under present (international political) circumstances, there is no other issue as serious as this, affecting the nation's (future) fate; it is regrettable that not a word about the matter was reported to Prince SAIONJI.' To this, KIDO replied: 'I felt too sorry for Prince SAIONJI to report the matter to him; therefore, I didn't tell the Prince about it.' I reproached KIDO severely and said: 'This is not a matter in which considerations should be given to such private sentiments (of Prince SAIONJI). Facts are facts (and as such, they must be reported to him). Regardless of how great the Prince's opposition to it (Tri-Partite Pact) may be and regardless of how sorry you might feel (for reporting the matter to him), you

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must tell him all the relevant facts (concerning state affairs). This is your duty to His Majesty.' KIDO answered: 'Hereafter, I'll try to inform him about all relevant matters.'

"It is the opinion of Prince SAIONJI that in the future (especially after SAIONJI's death), regardless of how the general current of politics may shift, high court officials close to the Emperor; i.e., the three chief court officials, the Imperial Household Minister, the Chief Aide-de-Camp to the Emperor, and the Lord Privy Seal; must act in complete unison in assuming the responsibilities for assisting the Emperor's reign. However, at present, these three are mutually incapacitated for any (constructive) actions through reciprocal counter-checking. Prince SAIONJI is saying that this is indeed a very regrettable situation for the Emperor.

"Furthermore, I still haven't forgotten that Your Highness had said to me one or two years ago: 'It is a sorry situation for the Emperor with that person (Admiral HYAKUTAKE Saburo) serving as His Majesty's Grand Chamberlain.' To shift high court officials at the present moment, summarily, would be the cause of breeding various political repercussions; therefore, I think it is advisable to wait for an opportune time and gradually consolidate the posts of high court officials, i.e., Grand Chamberlain, Imperial Household Minister, and Lord Privy Seal, with suitable persons. I should like Your Highness to sound out, on a suitable occasion, just whom the Emperor wants as successors for the aforementioned court officials."

His Highness gave his wholehearted consent to what

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I said. He agreed: "I am in complete accord with what you just told me. On a suitable occasion, I'll seek the Emperor's opinion (on whom His Majesty wants for successors to the above posts)." His Highness further said: "I want you to come again to see me whenever it is convenient for you any day after suppertime." I replied: "I'll come again soon," and returned home.

For supper that evening, I had invited the Governor of Kanagawa Prefecture, so I returned to (my home in) Oiso in a hurry. I dined with the Governor and the Police Section Chief of Kanagawa Prefecture. The governor was much vexed over the 'new order movement' (of Premier KONOYE) and said: "There might be various policies in interpreting and guiding the (political) situation and I feel troubled by the policies (the 'new order movement') of the present (KONOYE) administration."

On the 21st, I was invited by Admiral HASEGATA to his party for celebrating the construction of his new home. I dined with Marquis MATSUDAIRA Yasumasa; Admiral NOLURA; OTANI, the president of Nippon Yusen (NYK) and Vice-admiral TERAJIMA. These people expressed great dissatisfaction over the conditions within the Navy which favored the formation of the Tri-Partite Pact.

On the morning of the 22nd, I met the Imperial Household Minister (MATSUDAIRA Tsuneo) at his official residence and talked with him for about two hours. He was worried over the recent prevalence of rumors attacking him. There are many people with the surname MATSUDAIRA. As a result of this fact, rumors attribute to him the private or public (unsavory) acts which some other MATSUDAIRA had committed. For instance, the fact

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that (Viscount) MATSUDAIRA Keimin had been questioned by the public procurator has been rumored as if it had been the Imperial Household Minister who had been the one questioned. There have been other instances similar to this; MATSUDAIRA was much worried over the damaging consequences to his reputation. He emphasized: "Whatever may happen, I absolutely shall not resign for being the object of unreasonable personal attacks. A high court official close to the Emperor must have this self-possession." MATSUDAIRA further said: "I can't help but sympathize deeply over the Emperor's concern on diplomatic affairs." I explained to him (MATSUDAIRA Tsuneo) the reasons why the records (manuscript of the SAIONJI-HARADA Memoirs) were going to be placed in the custody of Prince TAKAMATSU.

At noon, I lunched with Baron IWAKURA; we discussed, from various angles, the relationship between the 'new order movement' (of Premier KONOYE) and the Diet. IWAKURA said: "I wouldn't like to see KONOYE made a serious (political) blunder." I replied: "This is not a personal affair of KONOYE alone. In fact, from a higher standpoint, it can be said that the general (political) trend could be oriented in the right (constitutional) direction, if KONOYE should firmly stand for the protection of the Constitution, maintaining its spirit. The present general situation of diplomatic affairs, domestic administrative affairs, and (totalitarian) control (of various phases of national life) can all be regarded as flagrant violations of the Constitution. This is the cause of the rampancy of the present day rightists (ultra-nationalists) and the frequent occurrence of violent actions (assassinations) on

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their part. To compromise with persons who resort to violent actions connotes the suicide of the nation's 'Rule of Law'; it would be the negation of the Constitution and everything else. In order to cope with this situation, the House of Peers, as well as the House of Representatives, must cooperate; they must unite to uphold the Constitution. Nothing can be effected by denouncing inefficaciously certain persons (ultra-nationalists) or certain groups (ultra-nationalistic organizations)."

Around 3:00 o'clock, I met (Marquis) MATSUDAIRA Yasumasa at the Yoshida. I explained to him, in detail, the arrangements I had made with Prince TAKAMATSU (in regards to having the manuscript of the SAIONJI-HARADA Memoirs kept in His Highness' custody).

From around 8:00 o'clock to 10:00 o'clock in the evening, I talked with Premier KONOYE in the Japanese-style room of the Premier's official residence. I asked him for recent news. KONOYE said: "Whenever KIDO (the Lord Privy Seal) is received in audience by the Emperor, His Majesty says to him: 'The Foreign Minister (MATSUOKA Yosuke) comes to me, always brags (about his diplomatic accomplishments), and returns.' According to KIDO, it appears the Emperor seems to be cognizant of MATSUOKA's efforts (as Foreign Minister). However, it seems there is absolutely no cooperation whatsoever between the Foreign Vice-minister and the Foreign Minister (MATSUOKA).

"After the Army withdrew from attempts at negotiating with CHIANG Kai-shek, MATSUOKA is singlehandedly carrying on (the negotiation with CHIANG). The Chief of the General Staff Headquarters, as well as leading Army

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officials, thinks he could hardly succeed (in negotiating with CHIANG); however, the Foreign Minister (MATSUOKA), with some hope of success, is at present trying (to come to terms with CHIANG). Should this effort (for coming to terms with CHIANG) fail, the government will request Germany to intercede in its behalf with Soviet Russia in order to make Russia cease her aid to CHIANG Kai-shek, and then try to compromise with CHIANG Kai-shek through the mediation of Germany. And should this not be successful, the Army will curtail its general scale of warfare with China. In order to make arrangements for this (last) plan, the Chief of the General Staff left for China by plane yesterday."

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Chapter 379
(5 November 1940)

Navy Worries over Japan-U.S. Conflict

Translated by Miss Fumiko Segawa

On the 23rd, about 8:30 a.m., Admiral NOMURA made an unexpected call at my home. In NOMURA's conversation, he mentioned: "Since you and the others strongly encouraged me, I was eager to proceed to the United States in the spirit of KUSUNOKI Masashige. However, taking various things into consideration, and looking at America's situation, it seems that President ROOSEVELT is of the opinion that neutralizing measures towards Japan are positively hopeless.

"During the time ARITA was Foreign Minister, SAYRE came from the Philippines. He talked on the non-aggression pact in the Pacific. The United States Government became greatly interested in this matter and tried a further strengthening of the ties of friendship subsisting between Japan and the United States. But, unfortunately, the YONAI Cabinet was overthrown and due to it, diplomatic relations changed abruptly. While the Japanese Army continues to insist on military power, the relations between Japan and the United States will never be amicable. Since it was futile even trying, the plan was abandoned. What about the Japanese Government? Well, the Japanese Government's fundamental diplomatic policy towards the United States is unformulated. Under such conditions of unformulated foreign policy, it is impossible for me to carry out my duties as His Majesty's Ambassador to Washington. Any disgraceful act will compromise the prestige as His Majesty's Ambassador. Hence, it would debase national prestige. Therefore, I did not accept it though I did not

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mention these reasons to MATSUOKA." Admiral NOMURA then talked on various current affairs. It appeared to me that he did not have any faith in KONOYE.

Several days later, I called on IKEDA Seihin and explained the events of the past few days. I told IKEDA: "The Navy has at last decided to come out from their ivory tower and discuss the situation with the influential men of the financial circles and lend an ear to their demands and dissatisfactions and reflect them in the Cabinet in order to prevent the government from committing blunders in national policy. As a means of complete preparation, the Navy must seek the understanding of those in the banking, financial, and industrial circles. The people's viewpoint is that although they try to explain the matter in a friendly manner to the Army, they do not seem to understand, but that the Navy might understand them. Therefore, this matter was brought up. On the 24th, the second-rate group will meet, and on the 26th, the first-rate selected group will meet and have dinner together and hold discussions with officials like the Minister, Vice-Minister, Bureau Chiefs, and Intelligence Bureau Chief." IKEDA admired Captain TAKAGI's efforts.

In the afternoon of the same day, I attended Marquis INOUE's wedding reception. In the evening, I had dinner at home.

On the afternoon of the 24th, I had luncheon together with OKUMURA, former Secretary of the Foreign Office, who recently was transferred to the Total-War Research Institute. He had just returned the other day from his inspection tour of French Indo-China. Therefore,

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while dining, I listened to his talks. Baron SUMITOMO's mother had passed away, so I suddenly had to leave for Osaka on the 3:00 p.m. train.

YAMAMOTO, the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet, boarded the train from Ofuna. Therefore, enroute to Osaka, I chatted leisurely with him for about four or five hours. YAMAMOTO stated: "I went over to see the Minister (Navy) and His Highness, the Chief of the Naval General Staff, several days ago and mentioned to them: 'The Tri-Partite Pact might result in a war between Japan and the United States. Therefore, the Navy has to bear heavy responsibilities. The preparations of the Navy at present are incomplete. I am of the opinion that a decision was reached after the Naval General Headquarters reached an understanding with the government on the armament required in carrying out a war. Therefore, as Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet, I am making demands for necessary funds and equipment and I seek your understanding.' The other time, His Highness, the Chief of the Naval General Staff, told me: 'All right, at the next council in the Imperial presence, I shall represent the Navy and make a demand to the government.' However, I am not aware of the result of that...."

I (HARADA) just recalled something regarding this. Therefore, I told YAMAMOTO about the question His Highness, the Chief of the Naval General Staff, had asked at the Council in His Majesty's presence, but he did not seem to be satisfied with the information. YAMAMOTO continued: "The number of ships in the Combined Fleet should be doubled. The number of planes must be doubled also. If such a large fleet is organized, I will not be

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content to withdraw to the Inland Sea and such places and wait for an opportunity to strike out. This is even in the event that war should break out and Tokyo should be in flames by the action of the United States Air Forces. If huge fires broke out in Tokyo and Tokyo is completely destroyed by fire three or four times; and if I must witness it while waiting for a strategically opportune time, I cannot remain still. Admiral YONAI is the most competent Admiral in such circumstances. At present, with a dearth of such people, a year has not yet elapsed since he became a reservist. He is still well informed about the Navy and I am now demanding Admiral YONAI's reinstatement from the Minister and Vice-Minister of the Navy. Today, just before leaving, I went to see them to demand this, but since they had guests, I did not see them. Let's meet again leisurely when we both return to Tokyo." We parted on that.

The following day, I attended the funeral of Baron SUITOMO's mother.

On the 26th, I reached Shizuoka early in the morning. During the morning, I reported to Prince SAIONJI on current affairs. I especially reported the matter which KONOYE had asked me to relate to Prince SAIONJI. It concerns Foreign Minister MATSUOKA, who is at present negotiating with CHIANG Kai-shek. If MATSUOKA fails in this negotiation, he will personally go to Berlin and Moscow. MATSUOKA, together with Germany, will try to stop Soviet Russia from supporting CHIANG Kai-shek and make direct negotiations with CHIANG through the mediation of Germany.

Prince SAIONJI said: "Whatever one may say, it is

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a glaring diplomatic blunder on the part of Japan to have Great Britain and the United States against her." Just before leaving, Prince SAIONJI asked me: "Are there any signs of local disturbances caused by the difficulty of living?" Prince SAIONJI was concerned about domestic affairs, especially about the problem of the people's livelihood. Prince SAIONJI sighed and said: "It would be favorable if KONOYE would face the present situation bravely, but nothing can be done about the situation if the Japanese Army is so (arbitrarily) powerful as under the present circumstances. This is an awkward position."

After my return to Tokyo, on the 30th, I stopped at KIDO's home in the afternoon. KIDO stated: "KONOYE came to see me a little while ago and said: 'On the occasion of the 2600th Anniversary of the Founding of the Empire, we would like to be granted an Imperial Rescript. It is the earnest request of UTADA, Section Chief of the 2600th Anniversary. Therefore, at the risk of my position, I am doing my best so that we would be honored with an Imperial Rescript.' KONOYE is a bumpkin. I recall the times when Prince SAIONJI said: 'He (KONOYE) is a peasant.' UTADA is also a rustic. The Imperial Rescript for the ceremony for commemorating the 2600th Anniversary had already been granted on February 11th. Therefore, if he requests again, there will be two rescripts. In order to add formality to the ceremony, UTADA is requesting another rescript. There will be formality to the ceremony without another rescript. Since one Imperial Rescript had already been granted on Empire Day, when the Premier reads his message to His Majesty, he should include an answer to the Imperial Rescript which had been granted on February 11,

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and thus the matter will be settled. He is a bumpkin by blindly requesting another rescript in order to add formality to the ceremony. He is a troublesome person. I did not raise any objections to KONOYE, but said: 'He (UTADA) is an odd fellow.' KONOYE said: 'If he is a nuisance, shall I dismiss him?' But I wonder if this is the proper solution?"

While we were talking, KIDO had a phone call from KONOYE. When KIDO answered the phone, KONOYE told him: "It had been decided by the Cabinet to secure an Imperial Rescript by all means." Therefore, KIDO replied: "Well, it can't be helped."

KIDO further stated: "Since there will be changes in the governors-general of Korea and Formosa, War Vice-Minister ANAMI went to Korea the other day. He went directly to see MINAMI and urged Governor-General MINAMI to resign. However, MINAMI disregarded his advice and stated: 'If they consider Chief Civil Administrator ONO to be in the wrong, I will make up for his defects.' Vice-Minister ANAMI very kindly advised him: 'Before you are ruined politically, I advise you to resign.' However, the governor-general did not agree to resign. He refused to resign; therefore, the Vice-Minister returned. Governor-General KOBAYASHI will probably be resigning soon too."

KIDO further stated: "The Army and Navy are planning to install generals and admirals in active service as governors-general. Therefore, the relation with the supreme command is a question. At present, there are Army commanders that are connected with the supreme command, and the question lies in the disposition of this matter. This is due to the scarcity of qualified persons on the reserve list. It

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seems that Admiral H. SEGAMI will succeed KOBAYASHI. If the present governor-general of Korea will resign, Gen. TERADA will probably be his successor.

"I (KIDO) don't know what the fate of Japan will be in the hands of MATSUOKA. He is a troublesome fellow. He severely criticized Ambassador TOGO and even theorized: 'SHIGEMITSU and KURUSU had been both his (MATSUOKA's) henchmen. They were capable and first rate fellows, but today, they are to the contrary.' He simply talks nonsense. The businessmen in the vicinity of Osaka seem to be having difficulties. Their export business was disrupted when Japanese ships were restricted from entering their usual ports of call which are within the sphere of influence of Great Britain and the United States. Therefore, their losses are estimated to be over ¥2,900,000,000." KIDO seemed to have heard a lot from the others on these matters and appeared to be worried.

On the 31st, I went to Oiso. On the 1st, I met TERAUCHI and spoke to him about the matters concerning the Governor-General of Korea. TERAUCHI remarked: "I am not qualified as a governor-general, etc." Therefore, I told him: "Oh, don't say such a thing. If you become the governor-general, remember to have someone as your Chief Civil Administrator who understands you and who is able to complement your defects. It is very risky for you to appoint someone as Chief Civil Administrator who has been assigned to you." TERAUCHI said he will do as I advised if he is going to Korea as the Governor-General.

On the morning of the 2nd, I went to see ARITA. ARITA seemed quite worried about the diplomatic situation and said: "The Non-Aggression Pact with Soviet Russia is

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unreliable."

That very same day, I met Captain TAKAGI after a long time and had a nice chat with him. He touched on various matters and according to his story, it seemed that the Navy wants Admiral NOMURA to be sent to the United States.

I then met Vice-Admiral SHIMOMURA Shosuke.

SHIMOMURA said: "If this present situation continues, there will be a clash between the United States and Japan. There might not be a war, but Japan might have to face an economic blockade and she will be unable to keep going. I wonder if there exists any means of conversion, for Japan will suffer a defeat if this becomes a war of endurance. The fate of the nation should not be treated indiscreetly." According to Navy circles, the Navy does not approve of the petition of amnesty submitted to the Cabinet by the Army.

On the evening of the 3rd, I met KURIYAMA and his wife at Marquis HACHISUKA's place in Atami. KURIYAMA, worried about the present condition, said: "When Germany was defeated in World War I, the other nations, unable to collect reparations, took German goods instead, and Germany's resources became straitened. In short, it caused people like HITLER to rise.

"In order to maintain the value of the yen, Japan is at present exporting goods extensively. Rice, sugar and other necessary commodities are being exported. Therefore, with the shortage of commodities, we are having a difficult time. Japan's situation is identical to that of Germany. If this condition becomes worse, I am afraid we will have a crisis. Is it possible that

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someone like HITLER might rise in Japan too? This matter requires serious consideration."

On the morning of the 4th, I went to Okitsu. I met Prince SAIONJI about 10:30 a.m., and reported to him on the current affairs. Prince SAIONJI worriedly said: "This is a troublesome matter. I feel sorry for KONOYE. I would like you to ask KONOYE on the following three points: 1) Where did KONOYE set his political goal; 2) Whether he intends to settle the China Incident; 3) Whether he is satisfied with the present diplomacy of Japan." Therefore, I am planning to meet Premier KONOYE soon and have a good talk with him regarding these matters.

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Chapter 380
(11 November 1940)

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Translator: Miss Miwoko Yanamoto

On the morning of the 4th, I (HARADA) returned to Tokyo. At night, I was invited to the home of HSU Ping of Formosa. I ran into Governor-General KOBAYASHI there. I heard that he was going to resign finally as Governor-general, and he said that Admiral HASEGAWA was taking his place. He said he would come to my place to talk at leisure soon, and we didn't discuss much that night as there were other guests.

On the morning of the 5th, someone came and said: "Prince KOROYU's reputation is quite bad. There are many who are saying petty things concerning his personal actions. I met Prince KOROYU once and told him a little about it, but, of course, I didn't tell him things which weren't serious enough to bring up. There are still many who say that it is distressing if he is like that. They are especially worried about the problem concerning the United States. The right wing, for instance, is suggesting the following, saying that they won't say anything if this plan is followed: appoint TOKUGAWA Yoshichika as Ambassador and let him take along someone like FUJITA Isamu who brought JOPH from the Soviet and who is the leader of the 'Ironins'. This is quite a fantastic opinion, and yet this is not so fantastic. TOKUGAWA Yoshichika comes from a historically famous family. If he should ride into the problem saying: 'I think that we should positively avoid a war between Japan and the United States,' and if we should tell him to carry on and say: 'If, by any chance, war should break out between Japan and the United States, I shall commit hara-kiri!', TOKUGAWA is sure to do it. I am thinking of telling that to Prince KOROYU." I (HARADA) said: "I think it is necessary to avoid war between Japan and the United States in view of

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the present situation in Japan. However, it is a question whether that is good or bad." I didn't show much interest in his story.

In the afternoon of the same day, I (HARADA) went to Hayama. I visited SAIONJI Hachiro. Around 6:30 p.m., I went to Prince TAKAMATSU's villa at Hayama as he had previously said: "Come and have dinner with me." I was there till around 9:30 p.m. talking about various recent conditions and returned to Tokyo.

His Highness told me that he had been very worried from before about the court officials close to the Emperor. He said: "I feel sorry for the Emperor, especially with a Grand Chamberlain like that." He stated that neither MATSUDAIRA nor KIDO could handle matters very smoothly. There are many moves of the administration that do not comply with the Emperor's desires. Amidst such worries, at least the court officials close to the Emperor should collaborate somehow so that the Emperor need not always be worried about trifles. This was necessary and depended especially upon the extent of the organization and cooperation of the Court officials close to the Emperor.

I (HARADA) discussed these various defects with His Highness. I told him about Prince SAIONJI's worries on this matter. At the present time, when Prince SAIONJI was unable to do anything about big forces, I thought that he could perhaps do something at least about this matter of court officials close to the Emperor, and I had told Prince SAIONJI at Okitsu about it. This, I told His Highness. I (HARADA) told His Highness about recent developments in the administration. I related the fact that in the instance of the Tri-Partite Pact, there was no advance report of the circumstances. I gave him various particulars concerning the sudden change of the government's attitude. His Highness said:

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"If the Navy Minister had only submitted a stipulation when the conference was held in the Imperial presence, it would have been all right. It is truly deplorable that the matter was determined without it."

Around 10:30 p.m., I (HARADA) returned to Tokyo. I had word from Admiral NOMURA that he would come to my place the next morning. Governor-General KOBAYASHI and ARITA, the former Foreign Minister, were also coming to my place on the morning of the 6th to eat together. I promised to see Admiral NOMURA saying: "It's all right, so please come."

On the morning of the 6th, KOBAYASHI, ARITA, and NOMURA came. We discussed various matters as we ate. Admiral NOMURA stated: "I have been repeatedly urged by the Foreign Minister to become Ambassador to the United States. However, I said I'd study the matter. As I have said before, when ARITA was Foreign Minister, Japan and the United States had just begun to come closer together when the Cabinet of that time in Japan fell. No effort was made after that to continue such talks. In America, including the President, they are saying: 'No pacifying measures towards Japan can possibly have any effect.' It looks as if America has already abandoned the idea. On one hand, I have asked Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: 'Does the Government have any policy set toward the United States?' There doesn't seem to be any. Looking at it from these two sides, it wouldn't be of any help even if I did go. I have definitely declined saying: 'I am not equal to the task.' However, both the Minister and Vice Minister of the Foreign Ministry say: 'Please make a special effort to go.'

"The Navy wants to find out, as soon as possible, what sort of counter-moves the American Navy is planning against Japan and what the general atmosphere is. The Navy is getting

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prepared as much as possible, but it would be wonderful if nothing happened. We do not want to sacrifice our valuable Navy now because of our Treaty obligations when Japan is so exhausted. Naval attaches who have been in America long are especially very worried. For instance, when I went to offer my condolences for Vice-Admiral HARA Goro, Vice-Admiral SHINOMURA, who was recently placed in the reserve, spoke very pessimistically and said: 'Something must be done.'

Admiral NOMURA continued: "The War Minister also says: 'Please go to America.' Both the Army and the Navy are desirous that I go. Aside from the Army, I cannot possibly decline the earnest pleas of the Navy. Disregarding success or failure, clever or slow, on the grounds of friendship, I feel that I must go even if I'm practically a stop-gap. I have finally told the Navy Minister that I will go. I have not yet met Premier KONOYE. If you are going to see him to-day, please tell him that I would like to meet the Premier as soon as possible. I would like to take along with me, as my staff, the most capable men possible. The other day, when I met Secretary OKUMURA of the Foreign Ministry, I said: 'If, by chance, I should go to America, will you come with me?' In spite of the fact that he has previously tried hard to stop me from going to America, he said: 'If, by any chance, you should go, I shall be led to accompany you.' I shall also take along with me Dr. IIMOTO who has been with the Navy Ministry Secretariat for a long time and who is very well informed on international treaties of the Navy."

AMITA was also present and he said: "The reason that Americans were withdrawn from the Far East was not in order that America might prepare for war, but America withdrew her people in order to avoid war. I believe it would be proper

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to look at the matter in the following way. Since the Japanese Army is so unruly, America was worried that she wouldn't be able to control the situation if she were placed in the predicament of having to go to war on account of Japanese actions in China when America doesn't want war. Therefore, she felt it would be better to carry out the withdrawal of Americans as soon as possible."

Thinking back now, it can be surmised that the motive of the overthrow of the YONAI Cabinet was that the Army observed that Foreign Minister ARITA might bring Japan and the United States closer together and even go as far as a non-aggression pact. They worried that if such a thing happened, the military alliance between Japan, Germany, and Italy would become an impossibility, and they hurriedly overthrew the YONAI Cabinet. Now that I (HARADA) think it over, Gen. TERAUCHI came over often to my place at that time and said: "The YONAI Cabinet is all right. Only ARITA should be changed. That is to say, the foreign policy is bad." Even Gen. TERAUCHI, who didn't know too deeply about matters, had said such a thing. Of course, Gen. TERAUCHI, as War Councillor, was very much in favor of friendship with Germany. When SAYAMA came to Japan from the Philippines to strive for a closer relationship between Japan and the United States, the Army felt that this was a big hindrance to the establishment of the military alliance between Japan, Germany, and Italy which they desired at that time and this became the motive for overthrowing the Cabinet.

ARITA said, to Admiral NOMURA: "Before you accept, you should make the government determine its policy (toward the United States), or you will be repeating what Ambassador ABE (General) did or what Ambassador DEBUCHI, who went to America long ago, did."

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YOKAI, the former Premier, had also said to Admiral NOMURA: "No matter how much the War Minister urges you, you can't depend on him. You must be very careful about that."

ARITA further stated: "When Admiral NOMURA goes as Ambassador, the problem concerning the Japan-China Incident, the South Seas problem, and the problem concerning the Soviet, will become three very big problems. We must get together and make the War, Navy and Foreign Ministers and the Premier really determine the government's policies about these matters before Admiral NOMURA accepts. He must go on this solemn promise, or no results can possibly be attained." Admiral NOMURA was thinking that over very hard.

We discussed how Japan would check treaty obligations that would rise in connection with the military alliance between Japan, Germany, and Italy and how necessary it was to see that we would not be forced to trifle with the fate of our country. We might be requested by Germany to cut off the route when England begins drawing soldiers from Canada and Australia and starts sending them to England or to the battle fronts. We talked about the fact that we must anticipate the occurrence of various apprehensive situations and be sufficiently prepared. They went home around 11:00 a.m.

Then, I (ARADA) visited the Premier in the Japanese-style room of his official residence. I questioned him about the three points put up by Prince SAIONJI. LOBOYD said: "That places me in an awkward position. It can't be discussed simply. I shall go and talk to him personally. I haven't called on him in a long time anyway." I told him about Admiral NOMURA. He said: "I'll see him tomorrow morning at nine." I relayed this to the Admiral.

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That evening, I (HARADA) went to Prince TAKAMATSU's palace at Takanawa and requested an audience with His Highness who had just returned. I told him about the points which had been wrong, concerning the particulars about Admiral NOMURA which I had told him before. On the way home, I stopped in at the home of Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal KIDO, and also told him the same thing.

On the 7th I (HARADA) met IAHIWATA, the former Finance Minister, at the wedding reception of a friend's daughter. He said: "Let's meet soon," and I promised: "Let's get together around the night of the 9th."

At noon on the 8th, I (HARADA) asked Secretary OKUMURA of the Foreign Ministry and Captain TAKAGI of the Navy to come to TAKAGI's place in Toriizaka (Captain TAKAGI's brother's place) and had lunch together. The two had been Admiral NOMURA's advisors separately, but did not know each other. Therefore, I brought the two together. I told the two frankly about the story of Admiral NOMURA going as Ambassador to the United States. I requested them: "Let us cooperate and try to avoid any errors." Since Admiral NOMURA was confined to his home that day with a cold, I asked OKUMURA to go there that afternoon and have a good talk with him.

Around 6:30 that evening, IAHIWATA, a former Aide-de-Camp, came over for dinner as previously arranged. He had recently resigned as Commander-in-Chief at Sasebo, and was leaving soon for his post as commander of a new fleet. We discussed various recent matters. Around 8:30 p.m., MATSUDAIRA, the Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, came and after a friendly chat, they went home.

IAHIWATA was worried in connection with the situation in the Palace when he was serving the Emperor. He sympathized with

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the Emperor about the sudden change which brought about the present Tri-Partite Pact, in view of the Emperor's attitude and thoughts at that time. However, AMITA said: "The other day, I met YAMAMOTO, the Commander-in-Chief of the combined Fleet. He said: "Since matters have reached this stage and the Emperor has even issued an Imperial message (concerning the Tri-Partite Pact) we shouldn't say anything. But, it's still deplorable."

On the evening of the 9th, I (AMADA) invited KIDO, ISHIMATA, ARAKI and YAMAGIDA, of the Bank of Japan, and KASHIMAWA of Yokohama Specie Bank to dinner, and we talked about various matters. Before dinner, AMITA stopped by with ISHIMATA on the way back from somewhere, but AMITA went home without staying for dinner. ISHIMATA has heard: "The race between the Army and Navy concerning the material mobilization plan is very intense. TOYODA, the Chief of the Naval Construction Bureau, being a great man, seems to be strongly opposing the Army." He (ISHIMATA I) said: "In any event, since we are basically lacking in materials, we are still badly off no matter what we do."

The ceremonies in celebration of the 2600th Anniversary of the founding of the Japanese Empire was held on the 10th. Everyone gathered in front of the Imperial Palace, and both the Emperor and Empress were present. I (AMADA) also attended the ceremonies. The weather was good, and it was a very imposing ceremony. I saw Their Majesties from comparatively close by. As I looked at the Emperor with recent particulars in mind, I was deeply moved.

Seionji - Harada Memoirs

Chapter 381
(21 November 1940)

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Translated by Miss Miwako Yanamoto

On the 11th, I (HARADA) left the house intending to attend the celebration for the 2600th Anniversary of the Founding of the Japanese Empire. However, some personal business came up on the way, and I couldn't attend after all. I listened to Prince TAKAMATSU's congratulatory address by radio. It was very well done in his clear and lucid voice. The thing that moved the general public the most was that he said: "Subject, Nobuhito." This was a very controversial problem. Generally, the Imperial family - especially the brothers of the Emperor - seem to have the worldly idea that they are not subjects. Prince SAIONJI often spoke about the rules for members of the Imperial family and always said: "No matter whether brothers of the Emperor, or whoever they are; in short, even if they are brothers of mother and child in sentiment; their relationship to the Emperor is still that of sovereign and subject, and that should be made clear. Brothers of the Emperor should especially resolve to show a good example to the people as to the extent of their loyalty to the Emperor." The fact that Prince TAKAMATSU had voluntarily said: "Subject," before the general public, made this very clear, and I thought it was wonderful.

On the night of the 11th, I (HARADA) visited Admiral NOJIMA. He was at home with a cold. He expressed his feelings to me concerning the problem of his going to the United States.

When I (HARADA) returned home, WAKASUGI, the former

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Consul-General in New York, came over around 8:30. He talked about the problem concerning the United States. I urged: "Why don't you visit Admiral NOMURA and see him once?"

On the morning of the 12th, I (HARADA) visited KONOYE for I had to leave the next day for Okitsu. We discussed various matters in the Japanese-style room of his official residence. I said: "I am going to Okitsu tomorrow, and I would like to hear about foreign affair matters before I do."

KONOYE said: "I am thinking of sending CHOU Tsuo-min, and establish liaison with CHIANG Kai-shek at Chungking. WANG Ko-min, and WANG Ching-wei, also think that the plan this time is very good. There have been all kinds of plans before this, but this will probably reach CHIANG for the first time. Until now, there have been many that were tattered with in between. The fact is, when CHOU Tsuo-min met MATSUMOTO of Domei, he said: 'Since I have been requested in many ways, I am reluctantly going to Chungking. I don't think anything will come of it.' Thus, the men of the Army looked at it in the same way. However, when I met YAMASHITA Kamesaburo, it seemed that he felt that it could be done this time. YAMASHITA had gone to Shanghai the other day and had met CHOU Tsuo-min personally at Hongkong. It was YAMASHITA's observation that: 'The reason that CHOU Tsuo-min told MATSUMOTO that he was going reluctantly and that nothing would come of it, was because there is no one who will say that it can be done and go, even if he thinks it can be accomplished. I think there is a possibility of success in the very fact that CHOU Tsuo-min is attempting

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to go. I don't think that CHOU would go knowing that nothing could be done."

KONOYE added: "In any event, Ambassador ABE must return to Nanking again to complete the treaty. He will probably depart soon. KOBAYASHI will resign as Governor-General of Formosa and HASEGAWA will succeed him. Although the Vice-Minister of War even went out to Korea, it doesn't seem as if Governor-General MINAMI of Korea will resign, as I've told you before. Also, it is very distressing that ARIMA is always creating a problem in the new political order. Some time ago, I had a difficult time when I was pressed severely at the Privy Council about ARIMA's argument to resign. That day, when I returned to my official residence, ARIMA was there. I told him: 'I had a terrible time at the Privy Council on your account.' This is really a distressing matter. I thought that OBATA, whom I obtained from Sumitomo, would guide the ideologists a little more matter of factly. However, he is doing the same thing as they. If that's the case, my expectations fell." KONOYE thus expressed his thoughts.

After that, I (HARADA) went to Sumitomo and finished my business. I had lunch at a relative's place. I returned home around 4:30 p.m. That night, I had invited General and Mrs. ABE, their daughter; FURUTA of Sumitomo, his son; and Mr. and Mrs. OGURA for dinner. I had invited them to make the formal speech of match-maker for the FURUTA and ABE families.

During dinner, I (HARADA) had a phone call from the Asahi Shinbun. They asked: "News has come in that Prince SAIONJI at Okitsu has a very high fever and is very ill from either typhoid fever or nephritis. Do you

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know anything about it?" I immediately phoned Okitsu to inquire. That was the truth. It wasn't typhoid fever, but nephritis. I had been scheduled to leave late on the night of the 14th and see him (SAIONJI) the next morning. However, I said that I would leave on the Fuji on the 13th and reach Okitsu by night.

Around 9:30 in the morning of the 13th, I went to KIDO's place and talked about many things. I told him about the circumstances of Prince SAIONJI's illness and made preliminary arrangements. I departed at 3:00 p.m. and went to Shizuoka. I reached Okitsu past 6:00 p.m. Prince SAIONJI seemed quite ill. Under the very kind care of Dr. KATSUNUMA, Prince SAIONJI's condition became somewhat less serious, and he turned gradually for the better. Dr. KATSUNUMA said: "I have attended Prince SAIONJI for many decades. However, this is the first time that he talked even to me about national affairs when he was ill. His worries about domestic and foreign affairs have affected Prince SAIONJI's health a great deal. He would talk to himself and say many things like: 'It would be distressing if the nation were divided into two because of the new political order and such.' Or: 'It is distressing that foreign affairs are as they are.'" Anyway, the 15th, 16th and 17th, were very important. Dr. KATSUNUMA in consultation with Dr. MIURA, seems to have gradually turned his condition for the better.

On the 18th, I (HARADA) talked to KONOYE by phone. He said: "The acceptance by the United States Government of Admiral NOMURA, has reached the Foreign Ministry. It will be announced very shortly." Dr. KATSUNUMA said: "If there is any good news, please tell Prince SAIONJI."

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It will be a spiritual injection."

In case I couldn't see him, I wrote a letter and went into the sick-room with it. Although he was weakened, he was fully conscious. I expressed my sympathies and then stated: "It would be very distressing if Japan's position became very bad, harmed by the Tri-Partite Pact. Therefore, the Navy wants to avoid war with the United States to the utmost. Admiral NOMURA declined Foreign Minister MATSUOKA's urgings to become Ambassador to the United States three times. The Navy, in a body, requested that he sacrifice himself and go. The Navy said that they would make sufficient preparations for war with the United States, but nothing could be better if war could be avoided. The Navy didn't want to embark on a useless war with the United States at present. Therefore they asked Admiral NOMURA to make up his mind to go by all means. The War Minister, like the Navy, also asked him repeatedly to exert himself and please go. The Army said that they didn't really desire war with the United States. However, it was said that before Admiral NOMURA accepted, the Government's - War, Navy, Foreign Ministers and Premier - policy should be clearly determined. We said it would be distressing if Admiral NOMURA were not given an elastic and wide scope of authority as Ambassador. Terms which had sufficient margin should be submitted to him with which he could negotiate when he went to America. A sufficient exchange of opinions should be conducted regarding the problems concerning China and the South Seas - matters of a nature which might be expected to become problems. He (NOMURA) said that if the terms were submitted and they were all right, he would accept. That

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has probably been accomplished for the Admiral has accepted the position as Ambassador. The 'agreements' of the American Government has reached us. KONOYE's statement was that the Government, moreover, was even willing to give Admiral NOMURA authority to contract a non-aggression pact."

Prince SAIONJI seemed very happy to hear this and asked: "Is NOMURA really going?" I (HARADA) replied: "Of course, he is going." The Prince added: "Please give my regards to NOMURA."

In following, I (HARADA) told him how magnificent the ceremony for the celebration of the 2600th Anniversary of the Founding of the Japanese Empire had been. I also told him how much KONOYE was directing his efforts towards CHIANG Kai-shek concerning the Chinese problem. As if to himself, Prince SAIONJI said: "As for CHIANG Kai-shek, no matter what is done right now, I don't think he will agree to what Japan says." The interview was like that, and I withdrew after five or six minutes.

After that, Prince SAIONJI continued to improve a great deal, but there was no recovery from fatigue. Dr. KATSUNUMA exerted great efforts toward the recovery of his whole strength. Prince SAIONJI said to Dr. KATSUNUMA from his sick-bed: "There is your aim in your diagnosis? Rather than have you speak in local terms, I would like you to strive for the recovery of my basic strength as a whole. Never mind the details. Please endeavor more toward the recovery of the strength of the whole body." The doctor replied: "Naturally, I intend to do so along with the recovery of the local parts." Prince SAIONJI nodded. The 19th passed in strict watchfulness. His pulse increased

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on the 20th. His fatigue had appeared in the pulse, and efforts were being made to lower the pulse along with the fever and respiration. If this were done, he would be all right.

On the afternoon of the 20th, HIROTA, the former Premier, came to inquire about SAIONJI's health. He had some time due to the train schedule, and we discussed many things for about three hours at my hotel, the Minaguchiya.

Ever since he (SAIONJI) became ill, he had received a great deal of attention from the Imperial family. The Empress Dowager sent unpolished rice soup and candy. They were all things which she had chosen herself. Daily, the Emperor sent one 'sho' (equal to 1.8 litre) of milk and some soup which he himself partook. There were also gifts from Prince CHICHIBU, Prince TAKAMATSU, Prince KAN-IN, and others. As a result of Dr. KATSUNUMA's very earnest care, it seems as if he is gradually turning toward the better.

